- Reference
- PT/CR/1912-001
- Date
- 1912/1913
- Language
- German
- Place
“Und finde überhaupt, dass dies Übersetzen, durch das man ganz in die Sache hineinkriecht, nur eine Art des Verstehens gibt. Man lebt es und nimmt es hin, was eine Vorstufe des Begreifens ist, aber man erblickt es nicht als Abgeschlossenes und Bild; vom Urteilen ist, wenigstens bei mir, keine Rede.”
Historical Context
Gertrud Kantorowicz and Margarete Susman met in 1901 and developed a close intellectual friendship that extended over several decades. Both were associated with Georg Simmel, who encouraged their involvement in the German reception of Henri Bergson. At his invitation, Kantorowicz translated L'Évolution créatrice as Schöpferische Entwicklung (1912), while Susman translated Introduction à la métaphysique. Their correspondence provides a valuable perspective on the intellectual exchanges surrounding these translations and on the participation of women philosophers in early twentieth-century German philosophical culture.
Abstract
Gertrud Kantorowicz (1876–1945) was a German-Jewish thinker, art historian, poet, and translator who died in the Theresienstadt concentration camp in 1945. Her correspondence with Margarete Susman documents a longstanding friendship and intellectual exchange between two women thinkers in the early twentieth century. The collection preserved at the Leo Baeck Institute, catalogued as Gertrud Kantorowicz, undated, 1905–1929, 1933, comprises 46 letters from Kantorowicz to Susman, 14 of which are incomplete. The letters address personal matters alongside philosophical, literary, and intellectual questions, including Susman’s writings, Kantorowicz’s own scholarly work, and their relationship with Georg Simmel. Of particular interest are Kantorowicz’s reflections on her translation of Henri Bergson’s L’Évolution créatrice, which illuminate the relationship between translation, philosophical understanding, and the material conditions of intellectual work.
Remarks
1.Translation as philosophical understanding In a letter to Margarete Susman dated around 1912/1913, Kantorowicz reflects on her translation of Henri Bergson’s L'Évolution créatrice, a task she considers particularly valuable for her philosophical understanding in general (philosophisches Verstehen überhaupt). Yet she remains uncertain about her own position toward Bergson’s philosophy, especially the conclusions he draws from his conception of life. This uncertainty prompts her to reflect on the limits of translation as a distinct mode of understanding: “Und finde überhaupt, dass dies Übersetzen, durch das man ganz in die Sache hineinkriecht, nur eine Art des Verstehens gibt. Man lebt es und nimmt es hin, was eine Vorstufe des Begreifens ist, aber man erblickt es nicht als Abgeschlossenes und Bild; vom Urteilen ist, wenigstens bei mir, keine Rede. [And I find, in general, that translating, through which one penetrates deeply into the subject matter, affords only one kind of understanding. One lives through it and takes it as given, which is a preliminary stage of conceptual comprehension; but one does not apprehend it as something complete, as a whole that can be surveyed. As for judgment, at least in my case, it is out of the question]” (Lett. 15, 1166). Kantorowicz articulates here a distinction between three modes of engaging with philosophical thought: Verstehen (understanding), Begreifen (conceptual comprehension), and Urteilen (judgment). Translation constitutes a particular form of Verstehen, characterized by an intimate engagement with another philosopher’s thought. Through translation, one enters into the movement of the text, experiencing and following its argument from within. Yet this immersion does not necessarily allow the translator to apprehend the work as a completed whole (Abgeschlossenes und Bild), a distance that Kantorowicz associates with Begreifen. Nor does it immediately provide the independence required for Urteilen, the formulation of a critical judgment. Her reflections thus suggest a tension between the proximity to philosophical thought afforded by translation and the distance required for conceptual comprehension and evaluation. Rather than presenting translation as a merely subordinate activity, Kantorowicz identifies it as a distinctive mode of philosophical understanding, whose possibilities and limitations emerge precisely from its immersive character. 2. Philosophical understanding and the question of form This distinction can be further illuminated by another letter to Susman, in which Kantorowicz critically discusses Martin Buber’s philosophical writing, possibly referring to his Drei Reden über das Judentum (1911). She argues that the experience (Erlebnis) underlying Buber’s reflections has not acquired an adequate philosophical or poetic expression: “Da sind Gedanken unter denen ich ein Erlebnis ahne, die aber nicht Gedanke genug geworden sind, um das Erlebnis zu formen, um seinen Inhalt erkennen zu lassen, und die auch nicht Dichtung genug sind, um es anschaulich zu sein [There are thoughts beneath which I sense an experience, but they have not sufficiently become thought to give that experience form and make its content intelligible, nor have they sufficiently become poetry to render it perceptible]” (Lett. 14, 1166). For Kantorowicz, Buber’s writing fails to give a sufficiently determinate form to its underlying experience: it is neither conceptually articulated enough to make its content intelligible nor poetically developed enough to render it perceptible. She consequently observes that its content has not become something complete and self-contained (Geschlossenes), as a reality (Realität) or a determinate form (Gestalt). This criticism offers an interesting parallel to her reflections on translating Bergson. In both cases, Kantorowicz raises the question of how philosophical thought acquires a determinate form. Yet the difficulty is different: in her criticism of Buber, she questions whether the work itself has achieved such a form, whereas in her reflections on Bergson, she describes the translator’s difficulty in apprehending an already articulated work as a completed whole. A further perspective emerges from another letter to Susman, in which Kantorowicz discusses her philosophical work Vom Sinn der Liebe (1912). While expressing a personal detachment from Susman’s structural reliance on the concept of the symbol (Symbolbegriff), she strongly endorses the second part of the book, where Susman’s reflection on the tragedy of love frees itself from inherited philosophical frameworks: “Hier ist viel mehr noch als in dem ersten, Dein Ergreifen der Dinge auf sich selbst gestellt, auf seine eigne Form, unabhängig von philosophisch überlieferten Fragestellungen... Du solltest nicht ‘wissenschaftlicher’ werden, alles Wissenschaftliche muss sozusagen vergessen sein; als blosses ganz umgewandeltes Nahrungsmittel gebe ich es Dir zu, nicht aber als Form oder blosse Methode [Here, even more than in the first part, your grasp of things stands on its own, assumes its own form, independently of inherited philosophical questions …You should not become more ‘scholarly’; everything scholarly must, so to speak, be forgotten. I can accept it only as nourishment that has been completely transformed, but not as a form or a mere method]” (Lett. 18, 1166). Kantorowicz’s striking metaphor of umgewandeltes Nahrungsmittel suggests that inherited philosophical knowledge acquires its significance not by supplying an external framework or method, but by being thoroughly assimilated and transformed in the development of independent thought. What matters is not the disappearance of philosophical learning, but its transformation into something that no longer appears as an externally imposed structure. Read together, these letters reveal a recurring concern with the relationship between intellectual experience, conceptual articulation, and philosophical form. In her criticism of Buber, Kantorowicz identifies the difficulty of giving adequate expression to an underlying experience. In her reflections on translating Bergson, she describes the limits of an immersive engagement with another philosopher’s thought, which does not yet allow her to apprehend the work as a completed whole or to formulate an independent judgment. Her response to Susman, by contrast, emphasizes the possibility of developing an autonomous philosophical expression through the assimilation and transformation of inherited knowledge. Although these reflections do not amount to a systematic theory of translation, they illuminate the broader conception of philosophical understanding within which Kantorowicz’s experience as a translator can be situated. .3. Translation as intellectual and material labour In another letter to Susman, Kantorowicz refers directly to the exhaustion caused by her work on Bergson: “Wahrscheinlich weil ich mir Kopf und Finger an dem Bergson müde schrieb [Probably because I exhausted my head and fingers writing away at Bergson]” (Lett. 10, 1166). The expression Kopf und Finger brings together the intellectual and physical dimensions of translation. Translating requires sustained conceptual engagement with another philosopher’s thought, but this is inseparable from the physical labor of writing. Rather than separating these activities, Kantorowicz presents them as inseparable aspects of the same demanding process, offering a concrete perspective on the labor involved in philosophical translation, which largely disappears from the finished published work. The correspondence also reveals how the process of writing is exposed to interruptions and contingent circumstances. In another letter, Kantorowicz remarks: “Hier wurde ich gestern gestört, wodurch die Satzkonstruktion zerstört wurde [I was interrupted here yesterday, which disrupted the construction of the sentence]” (Letter 18, 1166). Although the remark concerns the composition of the letter itself rather than the translation of Bergson, it is particularly revealing: an external interruption leaves its trace in the very syntax of the text. Writing emerges not as an uninterrupted process of intellectual production, but as an activity shaped by the circumstances in which it takes place. These observations also shed light on the material conditions under which women pursued intellectual work in the early twentieth century. Access to uninterrupted time, appropriate working spaces, and institutional support was neither universal nor equally distributed. Kantorowicz’s correspondence brings these conditions into view, revealing philosophical translation as an embodied and situated practice, shaped not only by conceptual engagement but also by the time, space, and physical circumstances in which intellectual work takes place.
Transcription
Lett 15, 1166: (Anfang fehlt) Bergson-Übersetzung 1912-13 (geht nicht) zu schnell, wie ich dachte, aber es geht und wird glaube ich ziemlich gut. Es ist auch ganz wundervoll, u. ich habe sehr viel davon, ich meine in Bezug auf philosophisches Verstehen überhaupt; aber wie ich dazu wirklich stehe, weiss ich noch durchaus nicht. Ich meine, dass mir sicher etwas daraus bleiben wird, seine Grundvorstellung von Leben und wieder was daraus folgt. Aber nein, dies ist falsch ausgedrückt, nicht was daraus folgt, sondern was damit rein innerem Wissen ans Licht gehoben ist, was durch Bergson-Anwendung das eigene Lebensgefühl klarer u. stärker macht. Aber was er selbst daraus der übrigen Philosophie gegenüber schliesst, das fühle ich — erkennen kann ich’s noch nicht — als irgendwie unmöglich. Ob nicht da ein Irrtum darin steckt, dass er das schliessliche Gewonnensein (der Systeme) in Begriffen für die Methode, für den Prozess nimmt, vermöge dessen sie gewonnen wurden. — Aber ich weiss es noch nicht, u. finde überhaupt, dass dies Übersetzen, durch das man ganz in die Sache hineinkriecht, nur eine Art des Verstehens gibt. Man lebt es und nimmt es hin, was eine Vorstufe des Begreifens ist, aber man erblickt es nicht als Abgeschlossenes und Bild; vom Urteilen ist, wenigstens bei mir, keine Rede. […] Kennst Du den Stifter’schen Nachsommer, jenen Roman, es ist nicht Dein Buch, aber Du würdest es vielleicht dochlieben. Mir gehört es sehr, und wenn der Bergson fertig ist, muss ich etwas über Stifter arbeiten. Lett 10, 1166 : Mein geliebtes Susenkind, Ja es ist schrecklich u. unbegreiflich, dass ich dir nicht geschrieben habe – ich kann auch gar nicht sagen wie es kam, und weiss nur, das seine geradezu Faulheit im Bezug auf Briefschreiben mich überkommen hatte. Wahrscheinlich weil ich nur Kopf u. Finger an dem Bergson müde schreib. […] Mit dem Bergson geht es nicht ganz [sentence breaks off]
Source Edition
Bibliographic Reference
Bibliography
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Cite this Record
Pisano, Libera. “Letters to Margarete Susman (1912–1913).” Phil-Tragen Digital Archive. Record PT/CR/1912-001.


